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Surveillance and Shame in Dave Eggers’s The Circle 
_Abstract 
Shame is a complex and controversial emotion, but there are commonly accepted no-
tions of shame which revolve around questions regarding exposure, appearance and 
visibility. As Jonathan Finn notes, through digitalization and camera surveillance in 
public spaces, surveillance has become a “way of seeing, a way of being” (2012). 
Thus, the question of visibility — or invisibility — is as inherent to the concept of 
surveillance as it is to that of shame. Social media users tend to contribute to disem-
powering exhibition by sharing their personal information in the online public do-
main. In other words: today’s “Funopticon” (Lewis 2017) is all about self-exposure. 
Shame, on the other hand, is generally perceived as an affect that emerges from fear 
of exposure. But how sustainable is this notion of shame in light of contemporary 
digital ‘surveillance culture’ (Lyon 2017)? I will examine shame against the backdrop 
of digital surveillance in Dave Eggers’s The Circle (2013), while also drawing com-
parisons to our contemporary condition in the culture of surveillance.  
1_Surveillance and Shame: A Kindred Relationship? 
Surveillance “has widely been theorized to induce emotions or ‘cultures of emotion.’”1 
It has been observed that surveillance creates cultures of anxiety, fear and suspicion.2 
One just has to think of security surveillance at airports that can trigger anxiety.3 “Sur-
veilled space alters human experience” — and therefore the emotions involved.4 Sur-
veillance, however, has hardly been examined in the context of other emotions. I argue 
that the relationship between shame and surveillance calls for particular scrutiny be-
cause shame generates an internalization of the gaze that can be understood as a form 
of self-surveillance. Although it has been noted that shame has “an important role 
within modern surveillance,” 5 the link between surveillance and shame has barely been 
addressed across various disciplines. Whereas recent research centers on public sham-
ing,6 I am more interested in the phenomenology of shame in today’s “surveillance 
culture.” 7 
A commonplace understanding of shame are based upon appearance and a sense of 
being exposed. Through digitalization as well as CCTV cameras, surveillance has also 
become, as Jonathan Finn highlights, a “way of seeing, a way of being.” 8 Thus, the 
question of visibility — or invisibility — is as central to the concept of surveillance as 
it is to the phenomenon of shame. Finn’s notion of surveillance as a way of seeing and 
being draws attention to an important aspect: surveillance has become — to use a rather 
loaded term — “existential.” It is “existential,” meaning that it fundamentally marks 
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contemporary existence which is, to a significant extent, determined by regimes of vis-
ibility. Social media users tend to contribute to disempowering exhibition by sharing 
their personal information in the online public domain. Reversing Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon, Randolph Lewis has ironically referred to digital self-exposure “in the 
name of convenience, connection, or simply fun” as the “Funopticon.” 9 Shame, on the 
other hand, is generally perceived as an affect that emerges from fear of exposure. How 
sustainable, then, is this commonly accepted notion of shame in light of digital surveil-
lance?  
The concept of shame reveals the moral-ethical understanding of self and world, that 
is: how do I behave if I know that I am watched/unwatched? A key scene for the con-
nection between shame and surveillance is arguably Jean-Paul Sartre’s well-known ex-
ample of a man looking through a keyhole in Being and Nothingness. At the beginning 
of his analysis of shame, Sartre asks: “What does being seen mean for me?”10 The 
awareness of being watched makes the man look at himself from the observer’s per-
spective, which evokes shame for his indecent gesture. For Sartre, the very moment of 
being seen is self-reflexive, making one aware of one’s own vulnerability. He writes: 
“In interiorizing the shaming look” through self-reflection, the observed subject not 
only becomes the object of her own surveillance but also the judge of herself.” 11 Sig-
mund Freud’s concept of the ‘super-ego’ and Immanuel Kant’s notion of the ‘inner 
court’ both clearly resonate here.12 Freud and Kant both offer early models of the inter-
nalization effect via the disciplinary gaze on which Bentham’s panopticon and Michel 
Foucault’s panopticism are based. The crucial question of how to behave when being 
watched/unwatched is pertinent to both shame and surveillance, not least because 
shame as a moral censor exhibits a force of control similar to that exhibited by surveil-
lance. Shame as a moral censor or as a “social alert system” 13 triggers self-discipline. 
This analogy between the disciplinary gaze and the ‘regime of shame,’ that is “‘inter-
nalization’ of control, in the Foucauldian sense,” 14 draws attention to the important link 
— and indeed interdependence — between surveillance and shame. I argue that shame 
and surveillance share a phenomenological premise which goes beyond seeing and be-
ing seen. It is therefore not surprising that they also share common central ‘sub-con-
cepts’ that constitute them — such as visibility/invisibility, privacy, and the public. The 
central question I am raising in this paper is the following: how sustainable are com-
monly accepted notions of shame in contemporary digital “surveillance culture”? 15 
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What is the account of modern subjective experience in terms of surveillance and 
shame? 16 In the first part of the essay, I will introduce the concepts of shame and sur-
veillance, bringing to the fore their phenomenological analogy. In the second part of 
the essay, I will offer a close reading of Dave Eggers’s dystopian novel The Circle 
against the established theoretical background.  
2_Being-Seen and Seeing — the Phenomenology of Shame 
Although shame is a complex phenomenon with possibly “no agreement about where 
this emotion stands and what its constructive uses are, if any,” 17 there is, as already 
implied, consent amongst different disciplines that “the eye is the organ of shame par 
excellence.” 18 In fact, philosophical discourses on shame have revolved around the eye 
since Aristotle. But shame is also usually associated with the desire to retreat, to with-
draw, to hide from eyes — or at its extreme: there is a strong desire for death in the 
moment of shame.19 The German idiom “sich zu Tode schämen” (“to die of shame”) is 
not by chance. Moreover, there seems to be no doubt that shame is a “self-conscious 
emotion” 20 that makes one abruptly aware of one’s being in a moment of unwanted 
(self) exposure. The attributes linked to shame are typically negative, highlighting a 
sense of utter subjection and helplessness; body, mind and speech are negatively af-
fected. The fear of exposure has established itself as the most defining shame criterion: 
“The physical action accompanying shame is a shrinking of the body, as though to 
disappear from the eye of the self or the other.” 21 Shame is generally perceived as a 
negative emotion that makes the bodily borders suddenly present. 
This commonly accepted negative notion of shame — predominantly marked by the 
urge to disappear — has been criticized on more than one occasion. Not necessarily 
because its legitimacy was put into question, but because the prioritized pattern of with-
drawal and disappearance did not allow for a different phenomenology of shame. Ber-
nard Williams, for example, contended that it is wrong “to suppose that the reactions 
of shame depend simply on being found out, that the feeling behind every decision or 
thought that is governed by shame is literally and immediately the fear of being seen.” 22 
The desire to not be seen in a moment of shame arises because one is seen “inappro-
priately, by the wrong people, in the wrong condition,” and not because one does not 
want to be seen in principle. Furthering Williams’s observations, I have argued else-
where that “shame can also reflect a desire for utmost visibility.” 23 Being-seen is as 
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crucial to shame as the urge of not-wanting-to-be-seen. This other side of the coin re-
veals a positive intentionality of shame.24 To put it differently: shame not only invokes 
withdrawal but can also promote, “more positively, attempts to reform oneself.” 25 
However, shame is widely regarded as a negative emotion which entails a negative 
evaluation of the subject towards herself, based on the respective social value system. 
In other words: shame is commonly understood as heteronomous and primarily a social 
phenomenon. The heteronomous account of shame does suggest that shame is com-
pletely dependent on social factors and cannot take place in private. In their book In 
Defense of Shame, Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, however, 
put the heteronomy ascribed to shame into question and defend the autonomy of shame: 
“although shame involves a sense that one falls prey to an alien assault,” they argue, 
“this is clearly not always the case.” 26 They challenge the passivity and submission 
often associated with shame and argue for a non-social account of shame as shame goes 
beyond public opinions and social evaluations. 
It is clear that shame is a very disputed emotion and therefore must be recalibrated 
in its individual contexts. But whatever one’s take on shame might be, questions on 
visibility or invisibility — in their broadest sense, i.e., including questions on interior-
ity/exteriority and privacy/the public — are likely to remain central. And it is here, of 
course, where the analogy to surveillance becomes most striking. The omnipresence of 
being watched in today’s “surveillance culture,” which I will briefly outline in the fol-
lowing section, will show how the centrality of visibility or invisibility in discussing 
shame is of paramount importance for surveillance, too. 
3_‘Electronic Eyes’ Everywhere: Ubiquitous Surveillance Technology 
Surveillance technologies have become an integral part of the everyday. Contemporary 
society is increasingly shaped — and indeed controlled — by CCTV, biometrics, data 
mining, and monitoring technologies in cyberspaces, workplaces, and private spaces. 
Yet the idea of ubiquitous surveillance is not new in its essence as Astrid Schmidt-
Burkhardt has highlighted in her essay “The All-Seer: God’s Eye as Proto-Surveil-
lance.” 27 But has the ‘electronic eye’ really fully assumed the symbolic function of the 
‘divine eye’? Despite the similarity, the “idea of surveillance as ‘God’s eye’” remains 
controversial.28 For it might be argued that the symbolism of the centralized divine 
eye — or indeed the whole notion of the eye — reaches its limits in the face of post-
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 6 (2018): Surveillance Cultures 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2018/13898/ 
6 
panoptic forms of contemporary surveillance such as Haggerty’s and Ericson’s “sur-
veillant assemblage” — which describes the collection of information or ‘data’ about 
people from different places, e.g. social media, online shopping or police reports.29 The 
analogy seems to become precarious on the premises of the paradigm shift from ‘dis-
ciplinary society’ (Michel Foucault) to ‘control society’ (Gilles Deleuze) in which au-
thority and power are diffused.  
There is a shift from centralized surveillance to decentralized surveillance where 
surveillance mainly takes place through digital rather than architectural technologies.30 
This theoretical framework distances itself from the idea of the Panopticon and shifts 
the focus from institutions to networks, from Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ to De-
leuze’s “control society” — “a shift from discipline to unescapable control by technol-
ogy.” The powerful metaphor of the Panopticon, which stands for centralized and fo-
calized surveillance, gradually diffuses in the shift from visual surveillance to ‘dataveil-
lance’ (a term coined by Clarke in 1988). Surveillance has slipped into a “liquid state,” 
where it becomes difficult to identify the watchers and the watched alike.31  
But if surveillance no longer relies on visuals and does not seem to refer to exposure 
in the classical sense, can this article’s premise still be sustained? Indeed it can, because 
even if ‘dataveillance’ moves away from basic surveillance, that is physical surveil-
lance, the tracking and coding of data and the gathering of algorithms are still aimed at 
revelation and visualization of personal, institutional or mass information. As the con-
flated term ‘dataveillance’ — surveillance in the dark and unknown — suggests, the 
notion of the Latin word “vigilare” (watching) does not get lost. The concepts of visi-
bility and invisibility — and the implications of other key concepts they bear such as 
privacy and transparency — are not outdated in the context of dataveillance. On the 
contrary, negotiations between the public and the private are particularly challenging 
in times of dataveillance, where the question of how to define interiority becomes even 
more urgent, calling for a new concept of privacy. 
In The Circle, Dave Eggers’s dystopian imaginaries of contemporary digital surveil-
lance culture sketch flat and transparent characters, that is, embodiments of the so-
called “gläserne Mensch” which seem to be deprived of any sense of privacy. Self-
surveillance is carried out to its extreme here. One of the main goals of the Circle, the 
novel’s eponymous technology company, is to avoid shame through the radical public 
self-exposure of the individual which is intended to lead to total transparency. Today’s 
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ubiquity of surveillance technology begs the following question: how — and where — 
can shame be located if the premise is total transparency? In the following I will analyze 
Egger’s novel to further investigate the relationship between surveillance and shame, 
while drawing comparisons to the human condition in contemporary surveillance cul-
ture. 
4_Transparency at Every Cost: Dave Eggers’s The Circle 
Finn’s notion of surveillance as “a way of seeing, a way of being” is taken to extremes 
in Dave Eggers’s The Circle, a novel about an Internet company that has become a 
tyrannical monopoly, controlling not only the social media life of contemporary society 
but every aspect of human life, too.  
At the pinnacle of the Circle’s perfection, “Demoxie,” an obligatory account for 
everyone, is introduced, or rather, aggressively pushed through by the company. Eve-
rything from banking to voting is monitored, handled, and managed through one per-
sonalized account. Voting becomes obligatory, making Washington superfluous (as one 
of the company founders contends), such that gradually the Circle is able to disem-
power the U.S. government. The company’s interference in the democratic process can 
be read as a first step towards digital totalitarianism.  
The Circle, governed by three “Wise Men,” becomes the world’s most powerful 
Internet company through the invention of its “Unified Operating System” called 
“TruYou,” 32 which soon “subsumes Facebook, Twitter, Google, and finally Alacrity, 
Zoopa, Jefe, and Quan” (TC 23) and the development of “SeeChange,” a worldwide 
video surveillance system (TC 69). The Circle’s goal is to complete “ultimate transpar-
ency,” according to Bailey, one of the Wise Men: “We will become all-seeing, all-
knowing” (TC 69–70). Maebelline Holland, a young Californian woman who is fed up 
with a mediocre job in public administration, gets into the Circle with the help of her 
former college roommate, Annie, who has secured an important position in the com-
pany as one of the “gang of 40 members” (TC 348). Before long, Mae climbs up the 
corporate ladder, outruns Annie, and becomes, to a large degree, a mascot for the com-
pany. She “goes transparent” with a camera around her neck, becoming a role model 
for millions of people who watch her (almost) everywhere she goes — with “a few 
exceptions” such as “during bathroom usage, or at least time spent on the toilet.” (TC 
351) 
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Mae is thrilled by the generosity of this trendy company (they even offer insurance 
coverage for her parents, which she very much welcomes as her father suffers from 
MS, but, as we will see soon, the ‘price’ her family has to pay for it is high). Within a 
couple of weeks Mae buys into the company’s ethos of doing good and improving the 
world:  
And there was a wonderful thing that tended to happen, something that felt like 
poetic justice: every time someone started shouting about the supposed monopoly 
of the Circle, or the Circle’s unfair monetization of the personal data of its users, 
or some other paranoid and demonstrably false claim, soon enough it was re-
vealed that that person was a criminal or deviant of the highest order […] And it 
made sense. Who but a fringe character would try to impede the unimpeachable 
improvement of the world? (TC 240; emphasis mine) 
The word choice in this passage — which serves as the company’s vindication — is 
particularly striking. As the italicized text passages show, the political-religious rheto-
ric at work aims at foregrounding the company’s putative sanctity. The totalitarian traits 
of the Circle are becoming more and more visible: a dissident or “deviant” of the com-
pany’s ideology will be denounced as criminal. Mae is, of course, unable to see what 
is happening here. What is more, the way this passage is represented as her own 
thoughts with the means of free indirect discourse makes the dimension of her indoc-
trination even more unsettling for the reader. Under the guise of security and protection, 
total surveillance is legitimatized. There is, for example, “ChildTrack,” a chip im-
planted in children’s bones to allow parents and the police to track them at all times 
(this idea has been also recently thematized in the Black Mirror episode “Archangel”). 
Implanting a surveillance tool in the human body draws attention to a new violently 
imposed bodily experience of surveillance. The unsettling vision of such a physical 
intervention far exceeds the body scanners and the collection of biometric data that 
German author Juli Zeh criticizes in her novel Corpus Delicti (2009), for example. Zeh 
disapproves of the fact that the individual’s need for security is abused to actually an-
nihilate the civil rights of personal and political autonomy. There is a fine line between 
surveillance as a preemptive measure (for the sake of security that is framed as care) 
and surveillance as control (moving towards a totalitarian state).33 Eggers’s novel ex-
emplifies the repercussions of ignoring and transgressing this threshold. One of the tech 
company’s mantras — “caring is sharing” — ostensibly promotes the care for humanity 
but is at its core a process of dehumanization and desensitization (see TC 181). The 
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most straightforward symbol of the Circle’s putative human mission is a Chinese sculp-
ture with the significant title “Reaching Through for the Good of Humankind” (TC 
345 ff.): 
The sculpture was fourteen feet high, made of a thin and perfectly translucent form 
of plexiglass. Though most of the artist’s previous work had been conceptual, this 
was representational, unmistakable: a massive hand, as big as a car, was reaching 
out from, or through, a large rectangle, which most took to imply some sort of 
computer screen. (TC 346) 
In the disguise of reaching out, this sculpture represents the menacing omnipresence of 
this technology company whose ultimate aim is to make everything — and everyone — 
“transparent.” The mission of the company will be fulfilled when transparency has be-
come total. Remarkably, humanity is held up as the company’s flagship criteria but it 
is actually humanity that gets lost. Destruction takes place under the guise of care and 
the pursuit of perfection.  
It is important to foreground the human aspect represented in the novel when exam-
ining the link between shame and surveillance. The protagonist’s familial bonds fall 
apart due to her work commitment, which does not allow any room for private life, and 
because of the shameful surveillance experience she exposes them to. Mae’s parents 
grow suspicious of the Circle’s transparency claim and gradually withdraw from their 
daughter to the point that she gets worried and drives to their home to check on them, 
taking the whole wide world with her:  
She ran up the stairs, taking them three at a time, and when she reached the top 
and turned left quickly, into their bedroom, she saw them, their eyes turned to her, 
round and terrified. Her father was sitting on the bed, and her mother was kneeling 
on the floor, his penis in her hand. A small container of moisturizer rested against 
his leg. In an instant they all knew the ramifications. (TC 369) 
Mae willingly submits her parents to total observation in return for health insurance 
coverage (that is, medical observation); as a result, they all lose the protection that pri-
vacy enables and are exposed to the public in the most intimate of moments. 
Similarly, Mae is responsible for a well-meant ‘manhunt’ of her ex-boyfriend Mer-
cer, which ends in a suicide witnessed by millions of Mae’s followers. It is also rather 
disturbing that Mae is still jealous of her best friend and former role model Annie, de-
spite her collapse into a coma because of the employer’s inhuman work-load, pressure, 
and its revelation of a family secret via a new ancestry project called “PastPerfect.” 
Mae’s envy of her comatose friend brought Ellen Ullman, an American computer pro-
grammer and author, to state that “Mae, then, is not a victim but a dull villain.”34 
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Although Mae appears to forfeit her capacity for empathy, it remains questionable 
whether or not she fits the role of a villain. In any case, she becomes totally submissive 
to the Circle’s ideology. In allowing the total deprivation of privacy to anyone she en-
counters while ‘transparent,’ she sells off the enlightened right to individuality and free-
dom that is meant to be a hallmark of Western culture. If privacy is jeopardized, the 
loss of autonomous individual identity is at stake. Even if initially it seems that the 
choices Eggers’s protagonist makes are self-determined, it ultimately becomes clear 
that they are not. Her thoughts and actions are gradually replaced by the company’s 
ideology. At the end of the day she has lost herself and has become the Circle’s mari-
onette doll, without any relation to reality outside the Circle. And as the Circle devours 
more and more, soon there is actually nothing left to relate to outside the Circle. The 
shark metaphor below pronounces the power of the company even more: 
The lobster had been consumed, and Mae saw something gruesome and wonder-
ful: the lobster was being processed, inside the shark, in front of her, with lighting 
speed and incredible clarity. Mae saw the lobster broken into dozens, then hun-
dreds of pieces, in the shark’s mouth, then saw those pieces make their way 
through the shark’s gullet, its stomach, its intestines. In minutes the lobster had 
been reduced to a grainy, particulate substance. The waste left the shark and fell 
like snow to the aquarium floor. (TC 318) 
The Circle becomes all-encompassing. It is therefore also stylistically consistent that 
the characters Eggers draws are one-dimensional. Even Ty and Mercer, the two char-
acters who sense the danger of the Circle’s totalitarian power and try to resist it, are 
recklessly thrust aside by the Circle’s all-powerful surveillance system. The characters 
simply do not have enough substance or depth to combat it. What critics have at times 
criticized as poor literary quality is in fact fundamental to the message underlying The 
Circle. Eggers’s dystopian imagination of contemporary digital surveillance society 
sketches flat characters,35 embodiments of the “gläserene Mensch” (the transparent hu-
man being).36 Self-surveillance is carried out to its extreme. Mae’s wearable camera 
hangs down her breast not in order for her to counter-surveil in the sense of Sousveil-
lance — a term coined by Steve Mann 37 — but to fulfil the Circle’s demands and to 
“perform voluntary transparency.” 38 
Transparency is represented at the level of imagery, content and narrative in Eg-
gers’s novel. As we have seen already, there are various symbols of transparency (such 
as the Chinese sculpture); furthermore, the company’s buildings are characterized by 
glass architecture. Eggers’s third-person narrator also contributes to the “aesthetics of 
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transparency” at work in the text.39 The authorial view is established from the very 
beginning:  
They entered an elevator of glass, tinted faintly orange. Lights flickered on and 
Mae saw her name appear on the walls, along with her high school yearbook 
photo. WELCOME MAE HOLLAND. A sound, something like a gasp, left Mae’s 
throat. She hadn’t seen that photo in years, and had been happy for its absence. 
This must have been Annie’s doing, assaulting her with it again. […] Since the 
photo — she was eighteen then, angry and unsure — Mae had gained much-
needed weight, her face had softened and curves appeared, curves that brought the 
attention of men of myriad ages and motives. (TC 5–6) 
In terms of the narrative situation, The Circle confirms what Paul Dawson observes in 
contemporary American fiction, namely “a prominent reappearance of the ostensibly 
outmoded omniscient narrator.” 40 As the earlier quoted passage about Mae’s enthrall-
ment with the company’s ideology also shows (TC 240) a great part of the narration is 
filtered through the protagonist’s perception, that is, focalized on Mae. But even if the 
narrator’s omniscience seems partially limited as it is tightly focalized around the pro-
tagonist’s perception, the transparency claim is not impaired. The text alternates be-
tween two modes of narration: On the one hand, there is an all-knowing, heterodiegetic 
authorial narrator; and on the other hand, there is a narrator who tells the story through 
the lens of an “internal focalizer” (also referred to as “reflector” character or “figural 
medium”), especially then when free indirect discourse is employed.41 
In other words, the internal focalization — the narrator’s direct access to Mae’s 
mind — does not impair the transparency or omniscience claim, for the narrator alter-
nates between selected omniscience and omniscience, or, to use Genette’s terms, be-
tween internal focalization and zero focalization. Apart from this, this kind of narrator 
has been even referred to as “technically, a ‘covert’ incarnation of the authorial narra-
tor.” 42 Therefore, the storytelling omniscience cannot be denied: the text represents 
transparency at every thinkable level in order to criticize the company’s promotion of 
total surveillance under the guise of security and care. What does it mean though for 
the understanding of shame if total transparency is reached through the eradication of 
privacy? Assuming that the goal of total transparency presupposes the abolishment of 
shame, is Eggers depicting a dystopian vision of a shameless and therefore dehuman-
ized society? The following section will address these questions, foregrounding the 
concept of privacy as key in negotiating shame and surveillance.  
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5_No Privacy, No Shame 
Kids today. They have no sense of shame. They 
have no sense of privacy. They are show-offs, 
fame whores, pornographic little loons who post 
their diaries, their phone-numbers, their stupid 
poetry — for God’s sake, their dirty photos! — 
online… They are interested only in attention…, 
flitting like hummingbirds from one virtual stage 
to another.43 
The way Emily Nussbaum, an American television critic for The New Yorker, rhetori-
cally juxtaposes the lack of shame and privacy in her cultural critique of contemporary 
lifestyle is important for our discussion. As mentioned earlier in the paper, there is much 
debate,44 in fact, about whether shame can take place in private at all or whether it 
exclusively takes place in public. This dichotomy raises many questions, especially 
since the absence of a social setting does not automatically imply a state of privacy. 
Rather than presuming a strict distinction between the public and the private, it would 
perhaps be more appropriate to speak of gradations of the public and the private.45 
There cannot be privacy that entirely excludes the social. As Sigmund Freud’s idea of 
the super-ego and Immanuel Kant’s concept of the “innere Gerichtshof ”  illustrate, it is 
the nature of shame to presuppose some sort of division. This is because even if shame 
seems to be prompted in secret, its internalization always involves being watched by 
the ‘inner eye,’ which ultimately remains a projection of the eyes of others.46 Or, as 
Nita Lutwak and Joseph R. Ferrari put it: “The self is thought of as being observed 
disapprovingly by others, so that even when alone the individual feels scrutinized.” 47  
A discussion on privacy and shame is triggered in the public dialogue between Mae 
and Bailey, one of the Wise Men, after her widely hyped misconduct. Only recently 
employed at the Circle, Mae is caught by SeaChange cameras when she illegally takes 
a kayak from a closed renting station. Mae is reproached and cornered by Bailey first 
in private until she rather quickly gives in and adopts the Circle’s surveillance ideology 
in a commendable way. Bailey is impressed by her suitability and adaptability. She 
turns out to be the perfect candidate for the role they have envisaged for her. It is not 
by chance that Mae, the average girl, is the one who comes up with the three pillars of 
the company’s ideology: 
SECRETS ARE LIES 
SHARING IS CARING 
PRIVACY IS THEFT (TC 303) 
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Just like in George Orwell’s 1984, ideas are promoted through slogans onto which the 
dullness of their creator is projected. The world’s voluntary — and highly uncritical — 
performance of transparency for the sake of total surveillance through a perfectly dig-
italized monopoly is glossed as outrageous. It seems to be an easy task for the powerful 
company to convince everyone that total transparency is something to strive for as it 
opens up the access to knowledge, for “knowledge is an unqualified good.” 48 Mae in-
vents these eye-catching slogans, which aptly enhance the Circle’s vision, in the course 
of her indoctrination. Bailey makes her repeat their ‘privately’ held dialogue in front of 
the entire company and millions of viewers (TC 280–288).  
The slogan “privacy is theft” taps into the linguistic proximity of deprivation and 
privacy. There is an interesting conflation of meaning in taking away (deprive) and 
setting apart (privatus), if one looks at the etymology. Both words derive from the Latin 
‘privatus’ which means “set apart, belonging to oneself (not to the state), peculiar, per-
sonal” and is the past participle of privare “to separate, deprive,” “to take away” which 
comes from privus “one’s own, individual,” “single.” 49 Privacy, which has been long 
regarded as the protector of personal freedom and individuality in both Western and 
non-Western societies, is represented as diminishing in The Circle, as it creates space 
for secrets. There are moments in the aforementioned dialogue between Mae and Bai-
ley when Mae tries to defend the need for private spaces: 
“But I still think there are things, even if just a few, that we want to keep to our-
selves. I mean, everyone does things alone, or in the bedroom, that they’re 
ashamed of.” 
“But why should they be ashamed?” 
“Maybe not always ashamed. But things they don’t want to share. That maybe 
they don’t think people will understand. Or will change the perception of them.” 
(TC 288) 
Already in her defense of privacy, Mae starts swaying and moves away from the notion 
of shame, gradually complying with Bailey’s shallow assumption that shame is unnec-
essary. Without much effort, Bailey systematically convinces her that shame is only an 
obstacle on the path to truth: 
“Okay, with that kind of thing, one of two things will eventually happen. First, 
we’ll realize that whatever behavior we’re talking about is so widespread and 
harmless that it needn’t be secret. If we demystify it, if we admit that it’s some-
thing we all do, then it loses its power to shock. We move toward honesty, and we 
move away from shame. Or second, and even better, if we all, as a society, decide 
that this is behavior we’d rather not engage in, the fact that everyone knows, or 
has the power to know who’s doing it, this would prevent the behavior from being 
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engaged in. This is just as you said — you wouldn’t have stolen if you knew you 
were being watched.” (TC 288; my emphasis) 
According to the corporate philosophy of Eggers’s novel, the erosion of privacy pre-
vents shame. The logic behind this assumption is that constant surveillance leads to 
transparency — and transparency should erase shame.50 Surveillance is promoted as a 
moral regulator of disciplinary behavior in line with the basic idea of Bentham’s Pan-
opticon. The Circle’s premise is that the disciplinary gaze of the surveillant eye pre-
vents from the possible emergence of shame in situations where our behavior may be 
judged as inadequate, indecent or immoral.51 Bailey’s superficial assessment — and 
rejection — of shame is represented in the guise of a quasi-religious conviction and 
reveals a rather thinly veiled ideology that serves purely economic ends. The promoted 
shamelessness in The Circle obviously has a different connotation than the shameless-
ness for which Nussbaum reproaches today’s youth. Whereas reckless self-exposure is 
criticized as shameless by Nussbaum, shamelessness as the result of total transparency 
is regarded as the highest moral goal in Eggers’s dystopian novel. The way shame is 
represented in The Circle, namely as a disturbing emotion that distracts from “honesty” 
and truth, suggests that Mae’s employer is missing out on an important aspect of the 
issue: moral regulation is as inherent to shame as it is to surveillance. The company’s 
position completely ignores the fact that shame — as a moral emotion — would rather 
contribute to moral regulation than thwart it, as the recent endorsement of public sham-
ing demonstrates.52 The Circle is blinded by its demonization of privacy and secrecy; 
as Bailey indoctrinates Mae, he states: “Secrets are the enablers of antisocial, immoral 
and destructive behavior. Do you see how this is?” And he continues: “But my point 
is, what if we all behaved as if we were being watched? It would lead to a more moral 
way of life” (TC 289–290). What Bailey does not grasp is that surveillance by itself, 
without any ‘internalization’ — that is, shame — will not contribute to any moral reg-
ulation. The text makes no secret of the fact that the head of the company does not 
understand that surveillance in fact relies on shame. The underlying criticism here is, 
of course, that the hard-fought “Right to Privacy,” as defended in the eponymous essay 
by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890), is at risk of being destroyed through the 
ubiquity of digital surveillance in the name of security, protection, doing good, and 
moral enhancement.  
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Eggers’s novel is thus a cautionary tale about the erosion of privacy in the digital 
age, for the erasure of privacy and shame means the destruction of individuality. As 
Alan Westin contends, privacy is “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.” 53 After all, personality and individuality are formed through 
careful calibrations between the public and the private. In an 1890 article, two Boston 
lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, contended that the right to privacy is 
founded on a principle of “inviolate personality” which is part of the general “right to 
one’s personality” and also the “right to be let alone.” 54 In their account of the right to 
privacy as a legal concept, Warren and Brandeis advocated the importance of control 
over information of oneself. How much privacy should one give away? Negotiations 
between the public and the private are of paramount importance for the discourses on 
shame as much as on surveillance.  
With his admittedly exaggerated dystopia in The Circle, Eggers reflects upon the 
current socio-cultural trend to devalue and shrink the private sphere. What’s more, the 
powerful characters in this contemporary dystopia advocate the erasure of privacy and 
shame altogether for the sake of a morally perfect conduct of life. But the erasure of 
privacy and shame also means the erasure of inner lives. The ongoing revolutionary 
achievements of technology transform Mae into a desensitized machine-like being who 
performs transparency by default. There are only a few rare moments after Mae’s brain-
washing where signs of inner discomfort and suffering surface, expressed by a “black 
tear” inside her which is accompanied by millions of “drowning screams,” indicating 
remainders of humanity in the protagonist: 
It was 1:11 when the blackness swept through her. Her mouth tasted acidic. She 
closed her eyes and saw the tear, now filled with light. She opened her eyes again. 
She took a swallow of water but it only seemed to heighten her panic. She checked 
her watchers; there were only 23,010, but she didn’t want to show them her eyes, 
fearing they would betray her anxiety. She closed them again, which she felt 
would seem natural enough for a minute, after so many hours in front of the screen. 
Just resting the eyes, she typed and sent. But when she closed them again, she saw 
the tear, clearer now, louder now. What was the sound she was hearing? It was a 
scream muffled by fathomless waters, that high-pitched scream of a million 
drowned voices. (TC 375) 
The blackness of the tear which ought to be transparent is a cynical gesture, of course, 
and highlights the difference between these rare — and increasingly vanishing — mo-
ments of inwardness, on the one hand, and the performance of transparency — that is, 
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the voluntary self-exposure of the novel’s protagonist — on the other. The “drowning 
screams” also suggest that Mae, as the representative victim of today’s omnipresence 
of surveillance, hears the echoes of the screaming masses. Though it does so subtly, the 
leitmotif of the tear reveals a direct criticism of modern surveillance society. In the 
majority of the novel, however, surveillance is criticized with its own means, that is, 
surveillance is put into question by the emphatic representation of surveillance itself. 
The criticism lies in the over-presentation and over-determination of surveillance. 
The dystopia Eggers depicts in his novel is what Deleuze calls “control society,” 
that is, an all-pervasive surveillance by technology in contemporary society.55 Deleuze 
claims that a shift has taken place from Foucault’s idea of a “disciplinary society” to a 
“control society” in which authority and power are diffused: 56 “Rather than a Panopti-
con, with a centralized focal point from which activity is surveilled, we have a diffuse 
matrix of information-gathering algorithms. Everything is tracked and encoded, inter-
preted into patterns that are either acceptable or unacceptable.” 57 As a consequence, 
neither institutions nor individuals exercise power, but power has become an important 
part of the societal system, which still resonates with Deleuze’s definition of “control 
society.” However, it is the citizen’s voluntary performance of transparency which has 
enabled the emergence of contemporary “control society.” As opposed to Foucault’s 
“disciplinary society,” a “society of control” is no longer limited by institutionalized 
enclosures (e.g. prisons, schools, hospitals) but by continuous control.58  
Against this backdrop, there are two important observations to be made. Although 
The Circle “reflects a political perspective on mechanisms of social control that is com-
patible with Deleuze’s […] cautionary projections about the totalitarian future,” 59 the 
“control society” as defined by Deleuze is not entirely put into practice in Eggers’s 
novel, as there is still a visible hierarchy at work here through the Wise Men, the found-
ers of the Circle. Strictly speaking, a society of control is only reached when the sur-
veillant eye becomes obliterated, that is, not trackable. As Deleuze writes: “We are 
moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but 
through continuous control and instant communication.” 60 The new kind of control 
Deleuze describes is no longer rooted in institutions, it is ubiquitous, and not situated 
merely in the restricted space of disciplinary power. In The Circle, the superior posi-
tion of the Wise Men — who (still) control individuals and therefore exercise disci-
plinary power — supports the idea of totalitarianism in the Orwellian tradition. When 
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structures of power and governance become obliterated, however, the idea of totali-
tarianism will also need to be revisited.  
The decentralization of power in the Deleuzian society of control is important for 
the role of shame in surveillance discourse, too. How can shame be reassessed, if the 
surveilling eye can no longer be located but is rather dispersed in complex structures 
and networks? On the novel’s last page, in the epilogue, it becomes clear that the whole 
world is now controlled by the Circle: 
Mae had not reached her parents in a few months now, but it would be only a 
matter of time. They would find each other, soon enough, in a world where 
everyone could know each other truly and wholly, without secrets, without shame 
and without the need for permission to see or to know, without the selfish hoarding 
of life — any corner of it, any moment of it. All of that would be, soon, replaced 
by a new and glorious openness, a world of perpetual light. Completion was im-
minent, and it would bring peace, and it would bring unity, and all that messiness 
of humanity until now, all those uncertainties that accompanied the world before 
the Circle, would be only a memory. (TC 491) 
The Circle has fulfilled its mission of “closing the circle”: privacy has been destroyed 
by the omnipresence of surveillance, there are no more secrets, no shame. 
But — as discussed — no privacy and no shame would mean no individual, no cit-
izen. The concept of privacy is key to the understanding of shame in the age of digital 
surveillance. As my analysis has shown, the relationship between surveillance and 
shame is negotiated through privacy. However, just like shame, privacy involves a 
range of conceptual problems. The sociologist and Microsoft researcher danah boyd is 
quite right in highlighting that it is difficult to come up with one single definition of 
privacy.61 Along these lines it is also important to note that the shifting meaning of 
privacy goes hand in hand with altered conception of shame in the age of digital sur-
veillance. boyd’s study shows very well that the exhibitionism — hence, transpar-
ency — performed is selective.62 Socializing in networked publics also means control-
ling what information about yourself you give away: Today’s young social media users 
do control their performance, their visibility. Their account of privacy is navigated 
through a careful selection of what personal information to reveal, how to be seen; their 
private sphere remains intact, protecting the individual’s cognitive and emotional core. 
In Eggers’s uncompromising dystopia, however, Mae’s total transparency means she 
cannot keep anything to herself anymore. In the novel’s bleak projection of current 
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trends, the erosion of privacy means the destruction of shame, yet The Circle nonethe-
less makes it very clear that shamelessness through total surveillance must remain dys-
topian as it is a contradiction in itself. 
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